Coup in Mali Triggers AU Suspension

The African Union (AU) has joined in with its condemnation of the recent coup in Mali over the weekend; the second coup to have taken place in the country in nine months. On Tuesday night, the continental body echoed a similar sentiment by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by suspending Mali from the organisation until constitutional order is restored. 

Significance – AU Access Denied

In no uncertain terms, the AU expressed that it stands “in solidarity with the people and government of Mali” and therefore “condemns in the strongest terms possible and totally rejects coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of government in the continent”. Demonstrating alignment with ECOWAS and the communique which was issued by the West African body on Monday, the AU is calling for “the Malian military to urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks, and to refrain from further interference in the political processes in Mali…and a transparent and swift return to the civilian-led transition, based on the agreed transition roadmap for Mali”. In the meantime, Mali has been suspended from the AU and faces the threat of sanctions from the AU, in contrast with ECOWAS’ decision not to impose sanctions on this occasion.   

The AU suspension matches the action the regional body initially took in August 2020. This was then reversed in October 2020 after a transitional framework had been agreed upon. The difference in the stances between the regional and continental bodies lies in the threat of sanctions. Neither has imposed any sanctions as of now, however, the threat has been raised by the AU with its Peace and Security Council saying that it “will not hesitate to impose targeted sanctions and other punitive measures”. This is more in line with international partners such as the European Union and France who have threatened sanctions; France has also threatened to withdraw the 3,000 troops stationed in the country under Operation Barkhane. ECOWAS did impose sanctions in August 2020 in the form of border closures and a ban on financial transactions within the 15 countries that constitute the bloc.

Last weekend’s coup follows the ousting of former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta over corruption allegations and the worsening political situation in the country which brought about a coup in August 2020. This led to the establishment of a junta, Comité national pour le salut du peuple (CNSP), that handed over power to a transitional council with a civilian president, Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, in charge; Goita held the role of vice president.

Following a cabinet reshuffle that would have taken some power away from the military, Ndaw and Ouane were arrested on 24th May and were released to house arrest on 27th May, having both tendered their resignations. On 28th May, Goita was confirmed as a transitional president by the constitutional court.   

One name that is being tipped for the role of prime minister is Choguel Maiga.  Maiga is a former leader of the movement that led Goita and his men to undertake last year’s coup, M5-RFP, and has twice been a presidential candidate (2002 & 2018). He has close ties to influential cleric and M5-RFP leader, Mahmoud Dicko[1]. His selection would calm the nerves of many who are seeking more diversity of opinion and civilian involvement in the transition process but may anger France and other international partners over his policy of dialoguing with Islamist rebels rather than dialoguing with them.

Outlook – Constitutionalism at All Costs

The actions of the AU fall in line with its policy to suspend any member country if an unconstitutional change of power takes place, even though at points, this stance has drawn criticism[2]. The AU suspension means that Mali will be exempt from participating in or with all activities, organs and institutions of the AU, including the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) secretariat. This will have economic ramifications for the country, which was one of the early ratifiers of the agreement and would thereby see poverty fall from 14.4 to 6.8% according to the World Bank[3]. Should Mali fail to adhere to the AU’s stipulations, the imposition of sanctions would be dire. In fact, when sanctions were imposed in August 2020 at the time of the previous coup, the measures had a significant impact on imports, with 35.6% coming from within the ECOWAS regions[4]. 

To avert AU sanctions, the junta needs to act expeditiously by adhering to the agreed-upon timetable of holding elections in February 2022.  The risk of delay cannot be ignored, due to the need to establish a new government led by a civilian prime minister and in the interim, Goita will hold the presidency until such time as polls are held. A key point of note will be whether Goita and other military leaders adhere to the calls by both ECOWAS and the AU not to stand for elected office. If they do, we can be sure that sanctions will follow. 

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[1]He was considered for either a presidential or prime ministerial role in 2020 but resigned from politics before ever holding elected office. 

[2]For example, when the AU suspended Sudan following the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, there was criticism from some quarters, given that the putsch was overwhelmingly backed by the population. Similarly, the AU has been criticised by some for not making any pronouncements when the constitutions of Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire were changed, enabling the presidents of these countries to stand for third terms. 

[3]https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area

[4]https://www.kaiptc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20201028-Final-Policy-Brief-9-Axelrod-Aning.pdf