ECOWAS Sanctions on Mali may force negotiation

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has announced a fresh round of sanctions against Mali in response to the transitional government’s decision to move the deadline for elections from February 2022 as per the original transitional timetable to December 2025. These sanctions will hinder economic activity in both Mali and neighbouring countries. Although the effects may be dampened by the protection of essential goods, ECOWAS’ ultimate aim of forcing the transitional government to reassess their electoral calendar looks increasingly difficult to resist.

Significance – Limited Immediate Effect

Shortly after seizing power in August 2020, the then CNSP[1] junta stated that it aimed to hold elections by February 2022. However, the transitional government later held a conference to determine the timelines for elections, which recommended that elections be delayed for between six months and five years – the proposed date that they settled on was December 2025. ECOWAS has responded with a raft of sanctions designed to heavily impact economic activity in Mali. They include:

  1. Recall for consultations by ECOWAS member States of their ambassadors accredited to Mali;

  2. Closure of land and air borders between ECOWAS countries and Mali;

  3. Suspension of all commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS member states and Mali, with the exception of food products, pharmaceutical products, medical supplies and equipment, including materials for the control of COVID-19, petroleum products and electricity;

  4. Freezing of Malian state assets in ECOWAS member country central banks;

  5. Freezing of Malian state, SOE and parastatal assets in commercial banks;

  6. Suspension of Mali from all financial assistance and transactions with all financial institutions, particularly, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development and West African Development Bank.

The sanctions will impact Malian regional trade flows but not as significantly as might be initially expected. Some cross border trade is already being affected with reports of a backlog of trucks at the Mali-Cote d’Ivoire border and a rumour from a Senegalese farmers group that the price of meat in Senegal may increase as the semi-formal cross-border trade in cattle is halted. However, in 2019 for example, Mali imported USD 960 million worth of goods from Senegal (its largest import partner and Senegal’s largest export market). However, USD 532 million of this was refined petroleum which is protected under these sanctions. At least another 10% will be protected as food products. Mali’s largest export is gold which accounted for 92.4% of exports in 2019, primarily bound for the UAE and Switzerland. This is normally flown out of the country and whilst regional flights are suspended, some international flights are currently still operating and can theoretically be rerouted. Guinea has also claimed that it will not close its land or air borders with Mali, giving it access to the port of Conakry[2].

The financial sanctions are likely to be more effective. Already, Mali has been forced to cancel the issuance of USD 52 million (XOF 30 billion) worth of treasury bills as approval was not given by UEMOA officials for the sale. Much of Mali’s diaspora is found within the region – a 2020 report suggested that there are over 890,000 Malians across Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Mauritania and Niger alone[3]. Remittances from this constituency will now be unavailable via formal channels. The other major source of remittances is France and that will now be halted with the EU decision to replicate sanctions. 

Outlook – Compromise Needed

There will be some resilience on the part of the transitional government against immediately coming back to discussions, especially given the significant popular support (and popular opposition to ECOWAS) on which they are able to draw. However, this may wane as the effect of sanctions deepens.

These sanctions will, within the next 4-8 weeks, have significant effects on the Malian economy. We can expect short-term cash shortages towards the end of the month as salaries become due and the effect of lost remittances begins to show. Whilst Mali is largely self-sustaining for food and agriculture, other products will soon be in short supply such as construction materials and equipment and chemicals used in the mining industry. Whilst rerouting some goods through Conakry may be an option, the lead time for this will also be measured in weeks.

The harsh effects of the sanctions on not only Mali but on some of its neighbours raise the likelihood of compromise. Mali and ECOWAS have incentives to avoid a prolonged period of sanctions. Negotiations if and when they resume will focus on the period of transition. If elections were to be held in February as much as 50% of the country would not be able to vote due to the security risk to both voters and electoral officials. However, ECOWAS will insist that a line must be drawn somewhere and we have recent examples of their willingness to accept the results of elections in which people were ‘necessarily’ disenfranchised due to insecurity in the November 2020 election in Burkina Faso.

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[1] National Committee for the Salvation of the People

[2] Guinea’s own military leadership was not present at the ECOWAS summit

[3] Diaspora engagement mapping MALI. Diaspora for Development. (2020)

*Photo: Fawaz.tairou

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Nana Ampofo