Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup d'etat

There are 15 countries in West Africa, three have experienced coup d’etats in the last 24 months – Burkina Faso is the third[1]. On 24 January, a group known as the Mouvement patriotique pour la sauvegarde et la restauration (MPSR), led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba announced that they have taken control of the country to ‘stabilise the security situation’. It is an additional levy on attempts to preserve stability and democratic norms for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Burkina Faso’s immediate neighbours, particularly Cote d’Ivoire, and partners in the international community. Prior to the coup, Burkina Faso’s next elections were scheduled to take place in 2025, but transition plans will have to include a shortened calendar to prevent sanctions of the kind currently imposed by ECOWAS on Guinea and Mali.

Significance – Drawn Parallels

After initial reports of gunfire at military bases on 23 January, a confusing period ensued in which it appeared that the soldiers were mutinying to demand better conditions of service. Later the same day, citizens protested in favour of the soldiers, seemingly giving them more impetus to proceed further and by the morning of 24 January it was announced that the president had been detained. The same day, his resignation was published and the MPSR held a press conference stating that they were in control of the country, the constitution had been suspended and that they were closing the country’s borders.

Unlike the removal of former president Alpha Conde in Guinea, Kabore’s demise has not been attributed to legitimacy primarily. Rather it was his inability to improve the security environment – Burkina Faso has been host to terrorism, insurgency and civil unrest since 2014. The most recent official attempts to address the situation between June and December 2021 included reshuffling/dismissing senior civilian and military personnel such as the minister of defence, the prime minster and his government and then military commanders. There was no evidence of a consequent improvement in public sentiment. A coup was averted on 12 January and there is significant public support for the coup leaders which will be a factor in the new junta’s negotiations with ECOWAS as it has been in Mali.

Learning lessons from Mali, both the MPSR and ECOWAS have incentives to avoid harsh sanctions that will hinder regional trade. Whilst Burkina Faso doesn’t export significant amounts to its neighbours (roughly 6% of its total USD 6 billion exports in 2019), around 30% of imports in the same year came from three neighbouring countries alone (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo). Cote d’Ivoire is already feeling the effects of closed borders with Mali with trucks carrying non-essential items forced to queue at the border.

Facing down the security situation and preservation democratic norms are short and medium-term hurdles to establishing/maintaining good relations with ECOWAS and further afield. The MPSR has suspended the trial of former president Blaise Compaore (in absentia) and some soldiers who are accused of the murder of Thomas Sankara. One of the soldiers on trial is General Gilbert Diendere. He was Compaore’s right hand man and has been imprisoned since 2015 when he led a failed coup attempt to restore Compaore to power – other factions within the military came out to support the citizenry in quelling the uprising[2]. The release of Diendere and suspension of the Sankara trial is likely to appease factions within the military and could support moral. A successful fight against jihadist forces will require a unity and belief in leadership that has been lacking thus far.

Outlook – Funding needed

Sanctions are unlikely to be imposed on members of the MPSR immediately. ECOWAS will first evaluate the situation and hold engagements with them to map their intentions and provisional timelines for a return to democratic rule. Following an August 2020 coup in Mali, ECOWAS had agreed that it was reasonable to hold elections in February 2022, it was only when this was pushed back by a further three years that the harsh current sanctions were imposed. See: ECOWAS Sanctions on Mali may force negotiation.

Looking ahead, significant investment will be needed in the armed forces who are woefully underequipped. With France seeking to reduce its military presence in the region, it is not immediately clear where such support will come from, and this may lead to delays in the formulation of a timeline for a return to civilian rule as the main stated aim of the MPSR is to stabilise the security situation.

What will be of concern in many quarters is the growing anti-ECOWAS/anti-France/pro-Russia sentiment. Particularly in the Sahel, there is a popular sentiment that governments backed by ECOWAS and French-led forces have failed in the fight against militant extremists and they are seeking alternatives. Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group already appears to be active in Mali following a controversial agreement with transitional authorities and Russian flags have been being openly paraded in Ouagadougou since the coup took place. See: Foreign force projection on African terrain

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[1] Mali and Guinea experience coups in May 2021 and January 2022. A fourth, Niger, also experienced a coup attempt in March 2021. Four countries account for 9% of West African GDP, 20% of its population and 60% of its landmass.

[2] Damiba’s testimony was key in convicting Diendere. There was significant public support for the trial and Diendere remains a largely unpopular figure

*Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Ministère de la défense Burkina Faso

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