Opposition to the DRC's new electoral commission head solidifies
Months of tense negotiations have been brought to an end in the DRC as the Constitutional Court has finally approved Denis Kadima as the president of CENI. However, the appointment has come without the consensus of key political partners within the ruling Sacred Union coalition and also powerful religious groups that have previously been tasked with contributing to the peaceful conduct of elections. Opposition to Kadima’s appointment is strong and could see the country sliding towards levels of violence witnessed during the 2018 elections if mitigating actions aren’t taken.
Significance – Presidential fiat
Kadima was initially approved by the national assembly on 16 October, at which point it was left to President Felix Tshisekedi to give his assent. After protracted attempts at negotiations with all stakeholders, particularly religious groupings, that are meant to reach an agreement on a nominee, Kadima was sworn in by the constitutional council on 28 October 2021. The major roadblock was the powerful Conference Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO) and Église du Christ au Congo (ECC) groupings that represent the Catholic and Protestant churches respectively who refused to accept Kadima’s nomination despite six other religious denominations approving him. Tshisekedi’s decision to proceed despite the holdout from CENCO, ECC and others has immediate implications for domestic and international consensus ahead of upcoming elections – 11 provincial elections in December and general elections in 2023.
● A group of international partners mentioned their “regret that the stakeholders did not reach a consensus”[1].
● Moise Katumbi who heads the Ensemble pour le Changement grouping (part of the ruling Sacred Union coalition) wrote to Tshisekedi saying “supporting the irregularities that have punctuated the process of endorsing CENI members will inevitably lead the country to a new cycle of disorder”.[2]
● CENCO and ECC released a joint statement saying "the world will see and understand that the Congolese people are neither weak nor cowardly and that they are fundamentally opposed to the parody of the rule of law."
● In the days following the swearing in, a new platform called the Social and Political Forces of the Nation was launched to oppose what they see as the politicisation of CENI. The group plans to hold a peaceful nationwide march on 6 November that has already received support from Katumbi, CENCO, ECC, (former president Kabila’s) Front commun pour le Congo (FCC), and populist movement Lutte Pour Le Changement (Lucha).
Kadima is undoubtedly technically qualified to hold the position of president of CENI – he has approx. two decades of experience in African elections, including work for the NDI, UNDP, AU, ECOWAS, SADC[3], Carter Centre and a 19-year stint as head of the Electoral Institute for a Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Concerns that are being raised are rather due to his alleged closeness with Tshisekedi. Little evidence has been provided of their supposed ties, aside from them both hailing from the region of Kasai. The accusation is that Tshisekedi is selecting a candidate that will help him to easily win victory in the next elections, due in 2023. This adds to similar accusations that reforms of CENI that were approved by parliament in June this year did not go far enough to give the organisation much needed credibility.
There is precedent for this situation. The previous nominee for the position, Ronsard Malonda, was never confirmed due to his own alleged proximity to former president, Joseph Kabila. There has been a purge of those closest to Kabila since then (as well as the formation of a new government of which he is no longer part) and those raising issue with Kadima are questioning why the same action taken against Malonda has not been taken again. Tshisekedi had little choice once the national assembly approved Kadima. The country is already significantly behind its electoral calendar with a full voter registration exercise needing to take place alongside implementing reforms at CENI. His only other option would have been to begin the search for a candidate anew, a process that would almost definitely have resulted in a delay to the elections.
Outlook – Potential for significant risk
There is little chance that Kadima’s appointment will be reversed. As stated, the electoral calendar and the National Assembly’s choice leave Tshisekedi with few options at this late stage. Katumbi’s Ensemble may withdraw from the Sacred Union as a result. However, the damage to the Tshisekedi’s coalition is limited by the fact that Katumbi was already expected to attempt a presidential run himself (against Tshisekedi).
In the short term, the reaction of security services to the planned march on 6 November will be key determinant and measure of the risk outlook. Such demonstrations have previously turned deadly, and this will incite the protestors to take a more proactive stance themselves. This could contribute to significant increases in security and operational risks nationwide but in Kinshasa particularly.
Signals of a timely, unhindered and unbiased voter and candidate registration exercise could reduce opposition by signalling government and CENI intentions to stick to (admittedly tight) electoral schedules. Conversely, any delay (whether it be for financial, logistical or other reason) will likely be a precursor to similar levels of violence witnessed during the last election in 2018 that saw a death toll in the hundreds.
Ceteris paribus, regardless of their veracity, the claims of Tshisekedi attempting to seize control of CENI will contribute to a decreased trust in the electoral process. This in turn could significantly increase the risk of election-related violence (before, during and after the poll) and legal challenges to the eventual outcome. These risks could be slightly mitigated by a close partnership with some international partners such as the United Nations, civil society and transparency in communication.
—
[1] https://cd.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-by-international-partners-of-the-drc/
[2] He has also begun consultations with the leadership of Ensemble about a proposed withdrawal from the Sacred Union.
[3] National Democratic Institute, United Nations Development Programme, African Union, Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community.
Image: DRC flag map, Darwinek, CC BY-SA
—
We are an African-owned and managed firm delivering local knowledge supporting transformative and sustainable strategic decision-making. Do get in touch if you require assistance: advisory@songhaiadvisory.com