Burkina Faso’s Solhan terrorist attack and the evolution of security risk
On 4 Jun, suspected Islamist militants attacked Solhan village, Sahel region, Burkina Faso on the border with Niger (nearly 300km from the capital, Ouagadougou) killing 160 citizens and injuring dozens more. This is the second significant terrorist attack in a month and is illustrative of a shift in risk away from conventional military/government entities and toward vulnerable civilian targets in the northernmost parts of the country. Gold mining, which accounts for the bulk of Burkina Faso’s exports and FDI stock, has not been a focal point of attacks but is otherwise impacted.
Significance – Shifting targets
Security threats have been a salient theme on the Burkinabe risk landscape since 2016 at least. However, the nature of terror attacks in the country is now shifting. See: Three Key Things: Burkina Faso Elections 2020. Whereas previously targets were primarily entities directly linked to the ‘establishment’ i.e., military posts, government offices and aid convoys, this year has seen an increasing number of attacks on civilian targets such as markets and villages. These events (for example the Solhan attack last week and another on a market in Kompienga, Est Region that killed 30) are tied to government efforts to bolster its security services with the newly established Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP)[1] .
Burkina Faso’s circa 11,000 military personnel constitute a smaller force in absolute and per capita terms than immediate neighbours despite the threat from groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). To address this, a law was passed in December 2019 that allowed for civilians to be armed and given two weeks training to join in the fight. After a slow implementation process, the VDP now number around 45,000 and are actively taking part in both operational and intelligence missions alongside the army. Consequently, those villages supplying fighters to the VDP may be viewed as a strategically important target by extremist groups.
For the most part, despite geographic overlap, large-scale (foreign) commercial activity has escaped the worst intentions of attackers; with one notable exception. In November 2019, a convoy carrying workers of Semafo’s Boungou mine in the Est region was attacked by militants killing 39 and injuring dozens more. The convoy was travelling with a military escort but was still ambushed. The operation remained closed for almost one year but reopened following security upgrades and a new agreement with the Burkinabe government (including an army unit dedicated to protecting the mine).
Smaller scale gold miners are targeted in a different way, the fighters demand protection money and often a share of profits from smaller mines that operate in the many of the northern border regions. This provides them with a revenue stream that helps to finance their activities and thus, the government has attempted to shutter many small mines in an attempt to cut off this source of cash e.g., closure of Sahel region artisanal mines.
Away from the human tragedy and isolated pockets where the jihadists have significant control, the impression locally is that business activities continue to be able to operate largely unaffected.
Outlook – Preserving key resources
Key political and economic constraints have governed the decision making of Burkina Faso’s Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP)[2] administration and the extremist elements alike. With such a limited fighting force, the Burkinabe armed forces are limited in how much protection they can offer to private businesses and civilians at the same time. Hence, the creation of the VDP. However, security risk differs significantly along lines of geography and activity. For example, the larger mines linked to Burkina Faso’s principal exports and capital inflows, benefit from army protection and often operate from large, fortified sites with staff flown in and out by helicopter. And extremist activities have not interrupted normal commercial activity in much of the country. Nevertheless, unless and until the capabilities of the conventional forces and/or the VDP are upgraded, the exposure of the civilian population to risk in the northernmost regions of the country remains significant.
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[1] Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland
[2] People’s Movement for Progress
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