Election analysis: Nigeria 2023 (voting patterns and political risk)
Elections are due in a year. But Nigeria’s poll results over the past six cycles indicate that representativeness has not improved despite electoral reforms. Voter turnout was just 36% when a presidential election was last held in 2019, and only two out of 10 registered voters in Lagos (the economic capital) actually voted in that election. It is a limiting feature for Nigeria’s structural political risk rating. Deeper reforms addressing the three issues outlined below could enhance the integrity of voting patterns, democratic credibility and improve the political risk score.
1. Roll degradation
The Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) capacity to maintain an accurate voter register is constrained by data, legislation and funding: (a) INEC has not updated the database to account for deceased or inactive voters since civilian rule was restored in 1999, and (b) the Electoral Act has not yet been revised to empower the commission to enforce electronic technology that could curb voter fraud.
President Muhammadu Buhari vetoed that revision before the 2019 elections and again last year, with northern legislators mainly in the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) claiming that the use of technology is not always practicable. Now, parliament has again re-amended the electoral law and the new version is pending presidential assent. INEC is also working with the National Population Commission to begin collecting data on deaths.
Without reform, the credibility of the voter registration process remains questionable. INEC has adopted biometric technology since 2011, but politicians continue to rig the registration process. One enduring method is the coordinated registration of voters who are below the eligible age of 18, especially children. Election observer reports show that this is most prevalent in the northwest and northeast. One report says underage registration was seen by around 13-16% of observers in these two regions ahead of the 2011 elections.[1] That was about three times more than was observed in the south. This pattern continued before the 2015 and 2019 elections.
2. Suppression
Another tactic is to ‘suppress’ the electoral process in opposition strongholds using state actors such as the army and/or non-state actors such as thugs. This was especially effective and pronounced in southern Rivers state during the 2019 presidential election. This oil hub in the Niger Delta is a People’s Democratic Party (PDP) stronghold and has long been a critical battleground (See: Nigeria 2023 battleground states). This is not just because of its oil wealth, but because of the link between state government funds and political party financing. To illustrate, President Muhammadu Buhari’s 2015 campaign chief, Chibuike Amaechi, was governor of Rivers at the time.
In the 2019 presidential election, the total vote tally in Rivers shrank to 642,000 from around two million in previous election cycles. The PDP’s winning margin in this state alone was cut to 320,000 votes from 1.4 million four years earlier. It allowed President Buhari to now overtake the PDP candidate in the president’s own strongholds up north. The federal army played a central role in this sudden change in dynamic.
Observers and journalists found that soldiers systematically acted to prevent voting and the collation of the presidential election results in Rivers. Soldiers ‘acting on behalf of a political party’ raided polling booths and collation centers – physically blocking the electoral process.[2] They directly snatched the ballots in some centers.[3] Collation for elections held in that state was eventually suspended or canceled in 90% of wards.
3. Vote buying
Anyone could vote multiple times before INEC began using voter card verification devices (aka card readers) in 2015. Politicians simply seized ballots and had them thumb-printed as much as possible to reach the desired number of votes. In the 2003 presidential election, the incumbent Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP won 99.9% of votes in his home state Ogun. There have been improvements but fraud continues to happen because voting without electronic verification is still admissible (See legal constraints described above). Moreover, the use of technology – however irregular – has motivated buying of votes.
From Lagos to Anambra and Kogi states, supporters of the main political parties have dedicated agents at polling booths around the country who pay voters the cash equivalent of USD10 or less on the spot – if they vote for the agent’s party. This means that a ruling party with access to state funds will have the most cash to disburse on election day, skewing results in its own favour. The practice undermines the credibility of official results and the volume of political capital that accompanies victory at the polls. The ruling APC’s candidate in Lagos’ 2019 gubernatorial election was an obscure figure who had little popular backing. The voter turnout was merely 18%, and the candidate won by a landslide with 76% of votes.[4]
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[1] Interim report on the voter registration exercise for the 2011 general elections (January 2011). Project Swift Count.
[2] Report on the 2019 Nigeria general elections (2019). Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room.
[3] How soldiers snatched election results in Rivers state – INEC officials (February 2019). Channels TV.
[4] Lagos state gubernatorial election result (March 2019). INEC.
*Photo credit. Emmanuel Ikwuegbu
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